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Output Effects of Government Purchases
ABSTRACT
Because of a small direct negative effect on privatespending, temporary
variations in government purchases as in wartime,would have a strong positive
effect on aggregate demand. Intertemporalsubstitution effects would direct
work and production toward these periods where output wasvalued unusually highly.
Defense purchases are divided empirically into"permanent" and "temporary"
components by considering the roleof (temporary) wars. Shifts in non—defense
purchases are mostly permanent. Empiricalresults verify a strong expansionary






(716) 275—2669Macroeconomic analysis typically assigns government purchases an impor-
tant role in influencing aggregate demand and thereby in affecting output
and employment. Bailey (1971) points out that these expansionary effects
are offset to the extent that governmentally-provided goods and services are
close substitutes for private consumption or investment expenditures. Hall
(1979) argues that temporary changes in government purchases can have a sub-
stantial business cycle role because they stimulate intertemporal substitution
of work and production. These effects are most important in the case of tran-
sitory expenditures that are not close substitutes for private spending--notably
forwartime spending--but would not apply to long-run changes in government
purchases.
The present analysisfocuses on the theoretical and empirical distinction
betweentemporary and permanent variations in government purchases.A simple
theoreticalframework is used to illustrate theaggregate demand role of the
temporarypart of these purchases. Some consideration is givenalso toc1irect
effects on aggregate supply, which arise to the extent that government services
constitute productive inputs for private firms.
The empirical section estimates the division of defense purchases into
permanent and temporary components by considering the effect of war and of
war expectations. Defense spending associated with wars is largely transi-
tory, while other changes in defense spending turn out to be predominantly
permanent. Shifts in non-defense federal plus state and local purchases are
also mostly permanent in character. Analysis of output reveals a signi-
ficant expansionary effect of temporary defense purchases, a weaker but still
highly significant expansionary effect of permanent defense purchases, and—2--
nosignificant effect of non-defense purchases. These findings reject the
polarhypotheses that either permanent defense purchases have no output effects
or that permanent defense purchases are as important for output as temporary
purchases,. Some discrepancies between theory and evidence arise for detailed
hypotheses that concern the formation of expectations on future values of
defense purchases. Overall, the empirical results are mixed in the sense of
verifying some aspects of the underlying theory--notably, in supporting the
usefulness of separating government purchases into temporary andpermanent
components--but in contradicting some more specific expectational propositions.
I. TheOretical Considerations
A. Aggregate Demand
Theimpact effect of government purchases on aggregatedemand involves
thepositive one-to-one effect of public expenditures net of any directly
inducedcontraction of private demand. For givenvalues of pricesr including
anticipated real rates ofreturn, the reaction of private demand to changes
ingovernment purchases involves several channels: 1) alterations inperma-
nent private disposable income corresponding to shifts in theperceived amount
of resources absorbed by the government in a long-runaverage sense; 2) direct
substitution of public spending for private consumption orinvestment, as
stressed by Bailey (1971, pp 152—55); and 3) substitution effects associated
with changes in current or anticipated future tax rates.
The first effect involves the perceived long-runaverage level of govern-
ment purchases. Since an increase in this average implies acorresponding
increase in the normal level of taxes--whether ocurring as explicit taxation,,
inflationary finance, or in a deferred form involving public debt issue--there
would be a roughly one-to-one downward adjustment of privateconsumer demand—3—
(see below). On this ground aggregate demand would be associated primarily
with deviations of government purchases from their perceived long-run average
value, rather than with the level of government purchases0 The channel of
direct expenditure substitution--as often illustrated by a publicly supported
school lunch program that replaces private spending on lun:clies--tends to less:en
the aggregate demand implications of government purchases even when those pur-
chases differ from the long-runrorm. Thethird channel involves substitutions
away from activities taxed by the government. In the case of labor earnings
taxes, the principal aggregate demand influence would be a negative ffect
of the normal level of government purchases on private demands, which would
correspond to a reduced average incentive to work rather than consume leisure.
(Note that an offsetting wealth effect on leisure would arise in consideration
above of the first channel of effects.) The aggregate demand influence of
consumption taxes, investment tax credits, or the like would depend more
closely on the timing of these levies.
The aggregate demand effects outlined above can be examined within the
following formal model. Suppose that the representative household obtains
utility from a stream of non-durable consumption expenditures C(t) and govern-
ment purchases G(t). I do not distinguish here or in the empirical work between
current government purchases,/which involve partly gross investment, and the
flow of government-provided services, which involve partly rental income on the
publicly-owned capital stock., In order to highlight the main arguments of
the first two channels of effect mentioned above, the analysis abstracts initially
from the labor-leisure choice and assumes lump-sum taxation. I assume that a por-
tion of government purchases substitutes directly for contemporaneous private
consumption expenditure so that the effective consumption flow at date t is
given by C*(t) =C(t)+OG(t),where o >0.1With C and G assumed to be measured-4-
in equivalent commodity units per capita,2 B >1would require a form of
efficiency advantage from public sector activity (as well as close utility
substitution between publiô and private spending), In the main analysis I
assume that 0 <B<1applies. At this stage government purchases are assumed
to have no impact on private production functions; this type of supply effect
is introduced below in section I.B, The utility function is assumed tO take
the separable form
(1) UV1[C*(t...)J +
wheret,,,, represents a continuum of time starting at date 0 and extending
over an infinite horizon, and V2 measures the effect on utility of the part
of the stream of government purchases that does not substitute directly for
the contemporaneous value Of C. The inclusion of this term allows one to
distinguish substitutability between C(t) and G(t) from the issue of whether
G(t) is valued by the private sector. The function V1 is increasing with C
at any date and likewise for V2 with respect to G.
Under lump-sum taxation the intertemporal budget equation for the rep-
Tesentative houaehold over an infinite horizon beginning at date 0 can be
written as
(2) K(0) +f0L(t)v(t)dtf0C(t)(t)dt tf0G(t)v(t)dt,
where K(0) is initial assets (accumulated real capital) per capita;
L(t) is the exogenous amount of real labor income per capita; and v(t)is
a real discount factor: v(t) exp[4fr(t)dr],where r(T)isthe instan-
taneous real rate of return on assets (capital) at date r. The last term
in equation (2) is the real present value of government purchases per capita,—5—
which corresponds to the real present value of tax collections perçapita
3
possibly including inflationary finance0For convenience I assume that real
/ labor income per capita grows at a constant rate A (perhaps reflecting the rate
At of labor-augmenting technical progress): L(t) =L(O)e,andthat the
"average" real rate of return is constant at a value i' >A.It is assumed
that a departure of the current return r(t) from represents a transistory
opportunity for a high or low return that may have strong intertemporal substi-
tution effects, but nevertheless represents a weak income effect. In particular,
v(t) etis assumed for convenience to be a satisfactory approximation in
formulating the budget condition of equation (2).
Defining the "average" ratio of government purchases to labor income as
(3)(7t(O)(i.X)f0[G(t)/L(t)]e A)tdt
and using the conditions C*(t)C(t) +eG(t),L(t) =L(O)eAt,v(t) =ert,
equation (2) can be rewritten as
(4)(-A)f0{C*(t)/L(t)]e
-tdt=(-A)K/L+1-(1•-
wherezeroes inparentheses are implicit in the symbols K, L and WE The
consumer'sproblem amounts to choosing the path of "effective consumption"
C*(t), subject to given values for the time paths of G(t), r(t) and Lt),'
and subject to the form of the budget constraintshowninequation (4).
Neglecting private investment,4 currentaggregate demand corresponds to
(5) d cd +G=C*+(l-O)G,
where zeroes in parentheses haveagain been omitted. With 7t fixed, an
increase in G has no wealth effecton the right side of equation (4). Therefore,for given values of real rates of return including the current value r(O),
C would be unchanged initially. Aggregate demand rises with G in equation (5)
in accordance with the coefficient (1-0), where 0 <(1-0)<1.The greater the
utility aubstitution between C and G, as measured by 0, the smaller the aggre-
gate demand impact of this type of temporary movement in government purchases.
Note that the implicit value associated with G, which would include the separable
utility influence measured by the V2 term in equation (1), is not directly
ertinent,
If ?71T rises along with the increase in the current ratioGIL, there is
a negative wealth effect as shown on the right side of equation (4) C
declines in the normal case, which implies a reduced overallimpact on aggre-
gate demand in equation (5). The quantitative relationship involves the
marginal propensity to consume out of "wealth." (Note that leisure isnot
allowed to vary in the present setup,) Of particular interest is thenet
effect on demand for the case where GIL and ?7i riseby equal amounts; that
is, when the change in. the government purchases ratio is permanent.
In some simple cases there is a steady state value of K/L that isdeter-
mined by parameters defining the production function, theutility function
in equation (1) including the "rate of timepreference," and the growth rate
A.5 In this situationa change in T:ieaves unchanged the steady state ralue
of K/L,,6 At least when the initial value of K/L equals itssteady state value,
the response in current C*IL would be one-to-oneinversely with. the change in
(l-)(7L)Aggregate demand as shown in equation (5) would then be invar-
iantwith the shift in government puchases Inthissituation aggregate-7-
demand depends positively on (l-e)(G/L -7r)-—thatis, on the value of
temporary government purchases--but is insensitive to shifts in the long-run
government purchases ratio 7t. This behavior implies in particular a strong
aggregate demand response to temporary movements in government purchases,
such as expenditures associated with wars, but no response to a secular
change in the government purchasestshare of gross national product,
Variable Labor Supply, Non-Lump Sum Taxation
An immediate amendment for the case of variable labor supply concerns
the negative wealth effect associated with 7t in equation (4) when 0 .￿.o < 1.
On this count an increase in ?7iT would tend to reduce leisure, which implies that
C declines by less than that calculated above. Accordingly;: aggregate demand would
tend to rise with equal increases in G/L and 7t, unlike in the previous example
where only the temporary component of government purchases influenced aggre-
gate demand However, this response is likely to be offset by substitution
effects of taxes, as discussed next.
Suppose that taxes apply to labor earnings, rather than being lump sum.
If there is no strong utility interaction between consumption and leisure
at particular dates (for example, contemporaneously) or if tax rates are
based on the normal government purchases ratio then substitution
effects of taxes on the current value of C* would involve primarily an
average of tax rates over time, which would influence the choice of the
present value of labor earnings. In particular, an increase in would
raise this average of tax rates and thereby induce substitution toward leisure
and away from consumption at various dates, This inverse effect of G/L on—o—
C* offsets the wealth effect discussed above, Overall, the analysis of con-
sumption from the previous section is modified in accordance with the net
wealth and substitution effects on labor supply of a long-run change in
earnings taxes. If a long-run expansion of the governments spending ratio,,
7t, motivates a decrease in work effort, then aggregate demand would tend
to decline with 7i, and vice versa for the casehere work effort rises.8
The analysis would be altered if tax rates do not always correspond to
the average value determined by 7t. Variations in current earnings taxes
could have an important substitution effect on current consumption if there
were a strong utility interaction between contemporaneous values of consump-
tion and leisure0 However, the sign of this interaction is not apparent.
The analysis requires more serious modification for cases of temporary taxes
on consumption, temporary credits for housing or other investment, andthe
like,, The intertemporal substitution effects of these fiscal instruments
would become a central element of the analysis. However, if the levying of
these types of taxes is not closely related to the contemporaneous value f
government purchases, then these effects would be basically separable from
the present analysis. From an empirical standpoint, if substantial variations
in temporary taxes occur (which has not been demonstrated empirically in terms
of an overall fiscal package), it would be desirable to hold these effects
fixed separately.
The main thoeretical conclusion remains as the major positive effect of
temporarygovernment purchases on aggregate demand; assuming that the direct
substitutionparameter 0 is well below unity. There are a number of channels
through which permanent changes in government purchases could influence-9-
aggregate demand, but the overall presumption isfor a substantially weaker
effect (of ndeterminate sign), as compared with the effect of temporary
movements.
B. Aggregate Supply
Aside from substituting for private consumer expenditure, government pur-
chases may represent intermediate products that serve as inputsfor private
firms. For example, police and fire services, highways, and even a system
of laws and national defense can be viewed in part as these typesof interme-
diate products. As discussed by Kuznets (1948, pp. :156-57) and Musgrave
(1959, pp. 186—88), a consistent difinition of national product would treat
these items as inputs that would not be double-counted as elementsof final
product. Problems with dividing government purchasesinto final and interme-
diate categories make this adjustment difficult to make in practice. I3venif
these adjustments were accomplished it would remain necessary to consider the
pgssible-effects of various public services, such as national defense, on
/ private aggregate supply.
To model the simplest possible case (see Barro and Grossman, 1976,Ch. 1
for some further discussion), suppose that a constant fraction 4,where 0 <c,< 1,
of current government purchases contributes one-to-one to aggregate commodity
supply; that is,
(6) Y5 = ÷G.
In some cases, such as national defense, it may be more appropriate tomodel
yS as responding to the long-run average value of purchases ,ratherthat G,
but the analysis is not greatly affected by this change. I do not consider—10-
here dimininshing marginal product of public services, the interplay between
these services and private productive inputs, or the possibility that govern-
ment purchases would exert substantial intertemporal substitution effects on
privatecommodity supply. (Compare the treatment of aggregate demand, as
discussed above in n,1,)Therefore, the portions of aggregate supply denoted
by...inequation (6) areassumed not to be affected directly by G,
The previous analysis of aggregate demand must also be modified because
the flow G constitutes income to households (possibly involving firms as
intermediaries). The budget expression in equation (4) is therefore altered
so that the last term on the right side becomes -(l-O-)7t; thatis,the nega-
tive effect of 7t on effective private resources is offset first, by the
fraction o that services equivalent to private consumer spending are provided
and second, to the extentthat aggregate commodity supplies are enhanced.
It is assumed now that 0 <0+< 1applies. In the case discussed above
wherethe capital-labor ratio was invariant with changes in the government
purchases ratio, aggregate demand would now depend on (l-0)(G/L-7t) +
Therefore,if 4 >0,aggregate demand would now rise with a permanent expansion
ofthe government purchases ratio.
C,Effects on Output and the Real Rate of Return
The translation of aggregate demand and supply effects into outputmove-
ments involves the determination of real r tes of return in order to clear
the commodity market. The central assumption is that is negatively related
to the current return r(O), while yS is positively related. The latter response
involves intertemporal substitution of factor supplies and final products,
which has been stressed by Hall (1979, section 2). In particular, periodswith relatively high values of r would be unusually rewarding to intensive
work effort and production.
Consider a temporary expansion of government purhcases, where GIL rises
while the normal purchases ratio G/L is held fixed. Aggregate demand rises
roughly as (l-0)G while supply increases as $G..(If supply depended on G
rather than G, there would be an increase only on the demand side.) Given
that (0+4>) <1applies, there is an excess demand for commodities-—that is,
a deficiency of currently desired saving--which requires a rise in the current
real rate of return r(O) to restore market clearing.9 Therefore, output and
the real rate of return both rise in response to an increase in (G/L -
Theoutput effect is greater the smaller the value of 0 and the larger the
value of 4>.Inany event the present setup implies that the output response
is less than one-to-one with the movement in G; that is, the model exhibits
a dampener rather than a multiplier.
The positive response of output to temporary movements in government
purchases would apply especially to wartime periods.10 The real rate of re-
turn can be viewed as the price signal that induces the intertemporal substitution
of resources toward periods such as wars in which aggregate output is valued
unusually highly. This type of substitution has been stressed by Hall (1979,
section 2), who points out also that this behavior differs in some important
respects from the response of supply to monetary misperceptions that occurs
in some business cycle theories that stress intertemporal substitution on
the supply side (for example, Lucas and Rapping, 1969; Lucas 1975; Barro 1980).
The effect of government purchases on the time arrangement of work and pro-
duct ion does not rely on elements of misperception with respect to the general
price level or other variables.A permanent increase in the government purchases ratio,where G/L and
i7T expand equally, leads to comparable rises ind and S The real rate
of return would not be affected substantially, but outputrises as long as
0. The positive effect on GNP of a permanent changein government pur-
chases is smaller than the effect of an equal, temporary change,because the
supply effects are equal and the demand effect issmaller in the permanent
situation.11 Therefore, permanent shifts in government purchases also involve
a dampened response of output.
Overall, temporary expansions of government purchases aredistinguished
from permanent purchases in that 1) the positive effect onreal GNP of
temporary purchases is larger, and 2)the relative value of the current
real rate of return is raised by temporary purchases.The last effect may
be difficult to test empirically because of problems in measuringanticipated
real rates of return and because tax effects on the return tosavings, which
would be associated primarily with the long-run averagevalue of the government
purchases ratio, may imply an effect ofi on the overall level of real rates
of return. In any event the present empirical investigationdeals only with
output effects of temporary versus permanentmovements in government purchases.
II. Empirical Implementation
The theoretical propositions will be tested by examiningthe effects
of government purchases in a reduced form relationship for output,as
measured by real GNP. The analysis is an extension of previous empirical
research (Barro, 1977, 1978; Barro and Rush, 1980) thatstressed the business—13—
cycle influences of monetary disturbances. This earlier work included a govern-
ment purchases variable (Barro and Rush, 1980, pp. 8,9) or a related measure
of military personnel, but did not distinguish temporary from permanent
governmentspending.
Suppose that a relationshiphas been isolated for the normal government
purchasesratio (Wt)interms of a set of parameters a and currently ob-
servedexogenous variables Z:
(7) (7r) =
Alinear reduced form expression for the log of output could be written as
(8) log(Y) .÷(G/Li +
or,using equation (7),
(9) log(Y)= + + 82F(Z;a),
where omitted variables denoted by ...includecurrent and lagged monetary
shocks, as stressed in previous empirical research. Lagged values of GIL
and7tcould also enter equations (&) and (9), but these effects were not
found to be important empiricallye
One hypothesis to consider is the polar case where 8l -82 >0;thatis,
the situation where a rise in the temporary part of government purchases
increases outputthroughan increase in aggregate demand, but where equal
changes in G/L and 7t do not affect output. Since this outcome requires a
zero supply effect of government purchases (c=0), it is more interesting to
test the weaker hypothesis,t3] >0,82 <0;which impliesthat temporary—14—
changestn government purchases have a larger positive output effect than
permanent changes. Since the effect of the latter is given by the sum of
the coefficients, ÷ the result > > 0implies that permanent
changesin government /purchases increase output--as would be expected through
the supply channel--and vise versa for_82
>> .
Additionalhypotheses involve the manner in which the Z-variables appear
across equations (7) and (9). If these variables do not appear separately
in the list of omitted variables in equation (8), the variables would
appear in equation (9) only as they serve as determinants for (W1T) in
the F-function of equation (7). Some cross—equation restrictions would
therefore be implied for the parameters of equations (7) and (9). The exclu-
sion of at least some of the Z variables from equation (8) is actually needed
even to test the hypothesis above that 0; see Barro, 1979b, section V,
for a general discussion of these types of cross-equation tests.
The next sections deal with the problem of modeling a form of equation
(7) for government purchases in the United States.12
A. Government Purchases Bquation
The stress on transitory movements in government purchases suggests
special attention to war-related expenditures, which are likely to be
viewed as largely temporary. I have proceeded empirically by separating
total government (federal plus state and local) purchases of goods and
services into a defense" component, GW, and other purchases, G. The
present analysis does not attempt to classify components of government
purchases in accordance either with their relative substitutabilities with—15—
private spending, as reflected above in the 0 parameter, or with their role
as inputs to private production, as measured above by theparameter. Dif-
ferences between defense and non-defense items with respect to these parameters
affect the interpretation of some of the empirical findings. Presumably,
defense purchases are characterized by a relatively low value of 0 and possibly
by a relatively high value of The former implies a relatively large output
effect of temporary defense purchases, while the latter would enhance the out-
put effects of both temporary and permanent defense purchases. The empirical
analysis would be sharpened by obtaining a division of non-defense purchases
into relatively homogeneous categories with respect to the 0 andparameters,
but the feasibility of this classification is unclear.
Defense Purchases
A primary determinant of GW would be the level of current and anticipated
future wartime activity, assuming that at least the timing of wars can be treated
as exogenous with respect to expenditure decisions. I have quantified this in-
fluence by using a casualty rate measure Bt, which represents battle deaths per
1,000 total population (see table 1) for the wartime years since the Civil War:
1898, 1917—18, 1941—45, 1950—53, 1964-72. Because of improvements in the tech-
nologyof caring for wounded and offsettingchanges associated with the
"efficiency"of weapons, itispossible that this variable doesnot consist-
ently measure the intensity of war at different dates. I considered using a
broader casualty measure that included wounded, but the ratio of this concept
13 to battle deaths showed no trend at least since the Spanish American War.
Since I was unable to obtain reliable annual data on wounded for World War II,
I have restricted my analysis to the narrower, battle deaths concept of
casualty rates.-16-
Prospective wars would be likely also to influence current spending,
with good information on forthcoming military actions existing prior to at
least the U.S. entrances into World Wars I and II. Since I have been unable
to construct any instruments for these war expectations, I have introduced
some actual future values of B into an equation for current defense spending.
This procedure introduces errors-in-variables problems into coefficient esti-
ination, although the present analysis is concerned primarily with obtaining
conditional forecasts, rather than with coefficient estimation pse. Lagged
effects of B on spending are introduced also into the equation.
Since defense expenditures involve a substantial investment component,
the amount of current spending would tend to be influenced negatively by the
size of existing capital stocks. Accordingly, I have/included in a defense
spending aquation the variable K1, which measures the beginning-of-period
real stock of military equipment, structures and inventories (table 2, col.5).
The relation of capital stock to current spending is assumed to be given by
(10). K bG +(l-a)K1,
whereis a depreciation rate and b measures the fraction of total defense
spending that constitutes investment (net of within-year depreciation on this
investment). The K' series was constructed with values of b and S that varied
over time (see the notes to table 2),but I have limited the theoretical dis—
cussion below to situations where these parameters are approximated satisfactorily
as constants. For generation of forecasts in the empirical analysis have
used the sample average values of 5 =16per year and b. =.34.—17—




w G is real defense expenditure, Y. isreal GNP;
A(L) is a polynominal in the lag operator L, whichallows both lags and
w
leads of Bt to affect
kW EKW/Y;
t—ltl ti
u is astochastic term.
The form of equation(ll) implies that a doubling f Y andt—l' for
given values of the B variables, leads to a doubling of G.
Empirically, two leads, the contemporaneous value, and up to a third lag
of B had significant explanatory power for g. In this case A(L)Bt =cLOBt
+
+ aB +aB +aB +aB applies in equation (ii). The — 2t—2 3 t-3 1 t+l 2 t+2 /-
errorterm was satisfactorily modeled as a random walk, so that equation (lli)




whereD is the first-difference operator and E u_ui is a white noise
error term. A constant is insignificant when added to equation (12) in the
empirical analysis; that is, there is no trend in the defense purchases ratio.
Moving-average error terms or more complicated autoregressive error structures
also did not add to the explanatory value of the equation. The form of
equation (12) suggests that a current shock would have a permanent effect
on the mean level of g". However, because of the inclusion of the k1—18--
term with a negative sign, this effect turnsouttoheless than one-to-one
in the tt1ong_j.jjj,tI as derived below.
Detérrninat ion OfNOrmal Defense Expenditures
Equations (12)and (10),, together with a specification for thc stochastic
structure of the B variable, imply a distribution for future values of gW,
conditionalon information available at date t (which is assumed in the present
case to include the values of B+i and B2). Equation (12) implies that







Equation Clo) can be used repeatedly to eliminate future values of kW from




+bik i)] +A(L)(Br. -Bt)
_b-[A(L)B1 +(1__b?)A(L)Bt+1,2 + •..+(1__by)'2A(L)BtiJ
+errorterm.
The variable of interest for output determination is
:{-)[g Eg./÷p)1,
where E is the expectation operator and p is a constant discount rate that
would correspond to-Ain the continuous time formulation of equation (3),
The variable g can be determined from suimriation over i in equation (14) to be





The effect of g is positive but less than unitary0 For a given value
of g, the effect of k1 is positive because it indicates that a greater
fraction of g' corresponds to a permanent component.
For the case where A(L) includes three lag values and two leads, and
where observations on the B variable through B2 are av,ailable at date t,
the expression in the last term of equation (15) can be written as a
function of the variables (B3, .., Bt)and of anticipated future
casualty rates, which appear in the form,
Co
(16) 'I EB+1+2/(1+p)1. 1=1
Theremaining work is to relate expectations of future values of B, as
entering through the ''variable,to currently observed variables, including
values of B up to Bt2.
Expectations of Future Wars
Calculation of expected future casualty rates is based on the following
stationary probability model for wars)4 First, a 2-by-2 matrix is specified
for the probability of war or peace next year (or rather for year t+3 when
conditions at t+2 are assumed known at date t), conditional on war or peace
prevailing currently. It is assumed that information about the future
course of B is contained fully in the most recent observation; earlier
values of B and values of other variables not having to be considered.
The probability of war during at least part of next year, given peace
for the latest observation, is based on data over the 1774-1978 period;
namely,
(17) p1Prob. (Bt+1 >0IBt
=0)=9/l62=.06,—20—
whre 162 is the total number of peacetime years in the sample(where Bt 0)
15
and 9is the number of these years that were followed bythe outbreak of war.




The valt of p1 is slightly higher if the sample islimited to the more recent
period 1889-1978 (the sample for which'\elatively accurateobservations on
and B are available), for which the result is p1 =5/63=.C7.
The probability of the continuation of war is given for the 1774-1978
sample by
(18) p2 =Prob.(B+i >olB
>0) 33/42 =.79,
where 42. is the number of war years (where Bt0) and 33 s the number
of these that were followed by anotheryear of war.'6 In other words. 9 wars
began and ended over the sample 1774-1978. For the 1889-1978 period the
result would be p2 =16/21=.76.Finally, the probability of no war




The expected value of B for the first year of a war is calculated as
the mean value for the 5 wars since 1889 (for whiôh accurate data on B are
available)
(19) BE(Bt+iIBt+i >0,Bt =0)=
-(.005+.23÷.OO4+.071i-.0Ol)
=.062—21—
Since war could break out at any time during the year,the annualized value
of EBt+i, denoted by BA, would be roughly twice theabove figure; that is,
l24
Finally, when Bt+i andBt
are both positive, the conditional expectation




whereB is the current casualty rate expressed at anannual rate if hostili-
ties applied only to a fraction of year t. The parameter ®lis based on the
assumption (not refuted by the small sampleof U.S, data) that wars tend
neither to grow nor contract over time, except that war mayend at some time
during yar t+l as governed by the parameter p2.Accordingly, 0l 1 -- (l-p2)
=
.90.The parameter ® is set so that the variable in equation (16) corre-
sponding to Bt+2 >0converges to the value associatedwith Bt+20 as Bt+2*O
(which essentially recognizes that anewwar may break out next year even
if one is already going on)0 The value of 00 turns out to he pBA
QQ7•
Accordingly, I use the relation,
(20) E(Bt+iIBt+i >O,B>
0) =.O07..90B
Equations (17)--(20) allow calculation of the relevant expectationof
future casualty rates in equation (16),
onobservation of B through Bt+2 andfora given value of the discount rate p.
Specifically, the result takes the form,
(21) -o
+iB12,—22--
wherep0 and p can be determined as functions of the pparameter.18 Speci-









Since p corresponds to the difference between the real rate of return and the
real growth rate, the values of the pcoefficientscorresponding to the lower
valuesof p would seem to be most pertinent.
The combination of equation (21) with equations (16)and (15) allows calcula-
tion of the normal government purchases ratio g as a funciion of the variables
(g, k1, B3,
,B)and the parameters (p, ?,cL0, a1,a2, a3, a1, a2),
where p is the net real discount rate, y measures the reaction of current defense
purchases to existing captial stock, and the a's and a's describe the effect of
the array of B variables on defense purchases. The results are therefore expressed
in terms of the general form of equation (7), except that government purchases
are now expressed relative to GNP, rather than relative to labor income.
Other coefficients that appear in the analysis, (cS, b, p1, p2, B) (see for—23-
example the expression contained in n. 18 above) are treated as fixed at the
values specified above: (S.16 per year, b =.34,p1 =.06,p2 =.79,B .062.
Government Purchases of Non-Defense Items
Statistical analysis of the non-defense portion of government purchases,
gP =g_gW,over samples beginning in 1929 revealed littled predictive value
for first differences Dg, except for a negative association with the contem-
poraneous change in the defense component,Dg'.19 This association would
reflect especially the crowding-out of non-defense government spending during
wars. The dependence of Dg only on DgW means that departures of gP from
the normal value gP are determined entirely by the difference between g" and
gWTherefore, with gW_gW held fixed, changes in gP amount entirely to shifts
in the permanent component gP• Accordingly, with the gw variables held fixed,
the coefficient of the gP variable in an output equation would reveal the
effect of permanent changes in non-defense purchases.
B. Empirical Results
The principal empirical analysis involves joint estimation of the govern-
ment purchases equation (12) and a relation for output of the form of equation (8)
(with government purchases variables now expressed relative to GNP, rather than
labor income). Hypothesis tests involving cross-equation coefficient restric-
tions derive from the calculation of g as determined by the coefficients from
equation (12), together with equations (15),(16) and (21). Thefirst.set of
tests involves the polar restriction that g and g enter with equal and opposite
coefficients in the form of equation (8)--or, equivalently, that the coefficient
of g is zero tn a form where the variable g-gisheld fixed--and that thecoefficient of g equals zero in this equation.Thesecondset of tests
checks whether the explanatory variables for g--inthis ca.se 8t+2
Bt3, k1--enter an
unrestricted reduced form for output asdetermined
solely by their role in determining gin accordance with the coefficients
of equation (12). The analysis is contingent on avalue of the discount
rate p, but results turned out to be relativelyinsentive to variations
in this parameter at least over the range from.01 to .05 per year. The
main results refer to a fixed value of p =.02per year, which is plausible
ex ante andcloseto a maximum likelihood estimatefor this parameter (in
forms that calculate g for equation (8) as above).
Jointly estimated equations for defense purchasesand real GNP were
calculated by means of a: non-linear maximumlikelihood routine from the
TSP regression package, which includes estimationof contemporaneous co-
variances for the error terms. The estimationis joint in the sense of
incorporating the role of the coefficientsfrom equation (12) in deterin&n—
ing the series g andtherebyinfluencing the fit for output in theform
of equation (8). Therefore, the coefficientsin the equation for Dg
are not determined solely to obtain abest fit of equation (12). I have
not carried out joint estimation in thebroader context of choosing the order
of the A(L) polynominal for the B variable in equation(12), in deciding to
omit moving-average error terms in the Dg equation,in analyzing the Dg
process, etc.
The joint estimates for real GNP and defense purchasesare
1946-78 sample
(22) log(Y)
2.94 ÷ .0356t +.84DMRt
+l.O4DMRt1
+.24DMRt_2
(.04) (.0007) (.20) (.20) (.16)
WW. W n A - +•Slg
—.19g; o =.0140,DW 1.2.
















Asymptoticstandard errors are shown in parentheses below the coefficient
estimates, Thevalues are asymptotic estimates of the standard errors of
the disturbance terms0 DW is the Durbin-Watson Statistic. yariablesin-
cluded in equations (22) and (23) are
Y:: real GNP (1972 base),
t: time trend,
DMR DM-D1 is "unanticipated money growth," as measured in earlier
research--Barro (1978, pp. 550-52)--where dI is an estimated value of money
growth from an equation based on the Ml definition of the moneystock,
gWGW/Y,where GW is real defense purchases (1972 base),
gP G/Y, where is real non-defense government purchases (1972 base),
B: casualty ratevariable as defined in table 1,
kW where is real government defense capital stocks (1972 base),
For present purposes. I focus on the role of the government purchases
variables in equation (22), neglecting the money shock variables, which have
effects similar to those discussed in previous research.22 The g variable
in the output equation is based on the specification for Dg in equation (23).
The main effect isolated in the equation for Dg is the strong positive spending
effect of wars, as measured by the casualty rate variable B. The equation shows
a two-year lead effect of the B variable and a lagged effect out to three years.
(The negative effect on Dg of the DB2 variable is difficult to interpret.)For present purposes the most important aspect of war spending is its tern-
porary nature, although precise calculations for g' involve the distributed
lag pattern of DB effects on Dg and the implications of these responses
for the behavior of the capital stock ratio kW. Equation (23) shows also
the expected negative effect of Dk1 on Dg.
Using equations (15), (16) and (21) and the value p= .,02, the point
estimates of coefficients shown in equation (23) can be shown to imply the
formula for g as follows:
(24) g .012 + .73g + .l3k1 -.05B3+ .02B2 -. l7B1
—.l9B—.13B —.08B
t t+l t+2
Equation (24) shows a positive but less than one-to-one effect on g of
a positive effect of k1 (for a given value of g), and a basically negative
effect of the casualty rate variables (again given the value of g). Values
of g calculated from equation (24) are shown along with values of g in
table 2, column 4. Because the gW_gW concept corresponds to a gap between
the current and long-run average values of the purchases ratio, rather than
to a spread between actual and "anticipated" amounts, it should not be
surprising that the variable exhibits a substantial amount of positive serial
correlation. In particular, the large number of peacetime years with small
negative values of gW gW are offset by a small number of wartime years with
w w
large excess of g over g .
Thetemporary defense purchases variable, g'-g, has a significant
expansionary effect on output as shown in equation (22) ("t-.value" of 4.8).
The normal defense purchases variable g is also significantly expansionary—27—
in this equation Ct-value of 4.7). The estimated effect for the permanent
purchases variable is about half that of the estimated temporaryeffect.
The results permit rejection of two extreme hypotheses: 1) that onlythe
temporary part of purchases affects output (whichwould require the coef-
ficient of the g variables in equation (22) to differ insignificantly from
zero), and 2) that temporary and permanent purchases are of equal importance
for output. The latter case would correspond to equal coefficients for the
g-g and g variables; that is, to the proposition that the g variable would
be insignificant in an equation that held fixed the value of actual spending




The coefficient of g differs significantly from zero, as indicated by
the t-value of 2.2. This result indicates that temporary defense purchases
are significantly more expansionary than permanent purchases.
The estimated coefficient on the g-g variable in equation (22),
0.98, s.e..20, indicates a roughly one-to-one effect of a temporary
change in the level of real defense purchases on the level of output.
Considering the standard error of the estimated coefficient, this finding
is consistent with the theoretical implication of a dampened response of
output to a temporary change in real purchases. However, a moderatemulti-
plier relationship would also not be rejected by this evidence. The relatively
high estimated output effect would be associated in the theoretical model with
a small value of the 0-coefficient, a high value of the 4i cofficient (see below),—28—
and a high real rate of return elasticity of aggregate supply relative to
that of demand,
The estimated coefficient on the g variable in equation (22), .51,
s,e. =.11,implies that a permanent increase by one unit in real defense
purchases leads approximately to a one-half unit rise in real GNP.23 This
result accords with the model's prediction that output would respond less
than one-to-one to a permanent change in government purchases;moreover,
the estimate is significantly below unity in this case.
The non-defense purchases variable 4 is insignificant inequation (22).
This finding accords with the view that movements in 4-with the gW variables
held fixed--reflect permanent changes that would not have majorconsequences
for aggregate demand. According to the theoretical analysis, a small output
effect of 4 would correspond to a small supply coefficient .Possibly,
the larger expansionary effect of g than of 4 in equation (22) reflects
the more important intermediate "production" role of defense purchases (see,
however, n. 23 above), This conclusion is not firm because of the large
standard error of the estimated 4 coefficient. In any case the estimated
coefficient on 4 in equation (22) is significantly below unity, which
rejects the existence of an output multiplier on non-defense government
purchases.
A combination of equation (22) with the formula for g in equation (24)
implies a reduced form expression for output in terms of a constant, time trend,
DMR variables, g, 4, the B variables, and k1. Unrestricted estimation of
this reduced form affords a test of the hypothesis that the determinants of
g--specifically, the B variables and k1--affect output only in the manner—29—
implied by equations (22) and (24). The testis based on the likelihood
ratio corresponding to unrestricted and restricted formsof joint estimation.
The value of -.21og(iikelihood ratio) turns out tobe 28.0, which exceeds the
5% critical value for the x2distributionwith 6 degrees of freedom (the number
of coefficients restrictions in this case) of12.6.24 Therefore, the hypothesis
that the determinants of g enter only in this indirect manner in influencing
output is rejected.
A likely reason for rejection of the null hypothesisis the existence of
direct positive output effects of war, which do not operate throughthe channels
specified in the present analysis. However, becausethe war variables are also
theprime basis in this work for distinguishing temporaryfrom permanent move-
ments in government purchases, it would not be feasible toallow unrestricted
direct wartime output effects and still carry out interestingtests of the
underlyinghypotheses. Other possible problems include errorsin relating
g to the present war situation, as determinedfrom equation (23) andthe
simple model of war probabilities; ariderrorsin the construction of the
DMRvariables;in particular, in the role of the temporary federal expendi-
ture variable in the equation for constructing anticipated moneygrowth
(n.21 above). The present analysis has important implicationsfor improving
onthe measurement of this temporary federal spending variable,which. may
interact substantially with the estimated effects of thegW variables in
an output equation.Table I
CasUalty Rate Variable
Notes: B is battle deaths per
to dates not listed.
1,000 total population.
Values of zero apply
Sources for casualty figures:Vietnam (1964-72):
and Spanish
of the U.S., 1977, p. 369,
table 590. World War I (191
American War (1898)Historical Statistics ofthe U.S., 1975, p. 1140,line
880. Korean War (1950-53)
yearly data from Dept.of the Army, Battle
Casualties of the Army, 1954,were applied to wartotal from Statistical
1977, p. 369, table
589. World War II
Abstract of the U.S
yearly data from Officeof the Comptroller ofthe Army,
Dec 41—Dec. 1946
and Nonbattle Deaths iflWorld War II
pplied to war tota1om Stat 15t
Final r,
icalAbstract of the U S.
table 589. Korean War and
369,
Strobridge, Chief, Historical
Services Division, Departmentof the Army.
value of B (per year) for
earlier wars are:Revolution
(1775-1783): 0.2, War of1812 (1812-15): 0.08,
MexiCan War (1846-48):0.04,
Civil War (1861-65, union
only): i.e. Casualty figures
are from: Civil War:
HistOriCalStatt? ofthe U.S., 1975, p. 1140,
line 880; other wars: Depart-
Appendix A.
story of Military
Mobilization in the U.S. Army,1955,
*yearly data were unavailable.
Figures are based on wartotal assuming equal














































































































1 .017 .031 —.014 .057 .158
2 .019 .033 —.014 .063 .175
3 .016 .032 —.016 .063 .176
4 .016 .032 —.016 .056 .187
1935 .017 .032 —.014 .050 .174




































































































































































































































































g C /Y, where Y is real GNP (1972 base). G is real defense purchases
(1972 base). Data since 1929 are from National Income and Product Accounts of
the U.S. and recent issues of the U.S. Survey of Current Business. The
fraction of nominal defense purchases in total nominal federal purchases was
multiplied by figures on real federal purchases (1972 base). Data from
1889-1928 are from Kendrick, 1961, table A-I, col. 5. Figures were multiplied
by 4.8, based on the overlap for 1929.
gWisthe estimated normal defense purchases ratio, as calculated from
eg. (24) in the text.
w w w.
k,K /Y, where K is the end-of-year value of net real stocks of military
structures, equipment andinventories(1972 base). Data from 1929-69 are from
Kendrick, l976,.table B-24, converted from a 1958 to a 1972 index by a constant
multiple (1.72). Fugures were extended to 1978 using data on various expendi-
ture components: military sturctures, ABCstructures,military equipment,
ABCequipment,inventories--GSA stockpiles, inventories--ABC stockpiles.
Depreciation estimates were based on rates used by Kendrick within each
category. His calculations assume a higher rate of depreciation during
World War II.
gP G/Y, where G is real non-defense purchases of the federalplus
state and local government setors (1972 base). G was calculated as total
gvernment purchases G less G .Sourcesfor G correspond to those above for
G ,exceptthat Kendrick, 1961, table A-ha was used for data from 1889-1928.Footnotes
'The form for C* (t) rules out an effect of the time path of G(t) on the
relative prIcettofC* at various dates. For example, a multiplicative inter-
action between C(t) and G(t) in the expression for C*(t) would generate a form
of complementarity where an increase in G(t) would stimulate a substitution
toward C(t) from private consumer spending atother dates. Complementarity
of this type between C(t) and the long-run average value of G would matter only
when the labor/leisure choice was introduced. The interaction of G with C
versus that with leisure would then come into the analysis.
2Th1s setup abstracts from explicit modeling of a possible public goods-
type scale economy for government purchases.
3See Barro (1979a)on the implications of deficit finance.
4The wealth effects discussed in the present analysis would not apply
directly to private investment demand. Direct substitution of public projects
for private investment would seem similar to the consumption substitution that
is governed by the 0-parameter.
51f production is subject to constant returns to scale, labor-augmenting,
technical progress occurs at rate X, G grows also at rate A, and
V1 =f0u[C*(t)]etdt,where p.> A, u[C*(t)] =a[C*(t)]b,a >o,o <b<1,
then a steady state involves C*(t) growing at rate A with the rate of return
given by p +A(l-b).Non-zero population growth could also be included,
as in Arrow and Kurz I97O, Ch. III). The steady-state value of K/L is deter-
mined by an equality between and the marginal product of capital.a finite horizon life cycle-type model, one would expect a decline
in the "target value" of K/L. In this case there would be a smallernegative
response of the current C*/L to an increase in GIL. However, this sort of
effect need not arise under finite lives ifintergenerational transfers are
included in the model.
7Barro (1979a,pp. 941-45) provides some optimizing rationale for this
behavior on the part of the government.
8This discussionignores government transfers, which involve a substitu-
tion effect away from work activity, but not the sort of wealth effect discussed
above. (Other substitution effects could arise, ofcourse, depending on the
nature of thetransfers.) Transfer payments also do not involve the direct
effecton aggregate demand associated with purchases of goods and services.
9The currentprice level will tend also to rise, possibly generating
the expectation of future deflation. A full analysis wouldrequire a model
of money supply behavior. Since the effects at issue areprimarily non-
monetary in nature, it is unnecessary for present purposes to carryoutthe
detailsof this analysis.
10Wartimemayalso be associated with. uncertainties on maintainingpro-
perty rights, which would tend to reduce private investment demand. Theanalysis
abstracts from this effect and from controlson prices or interest rates. Also
excluded are effects of patriotism or coercivebehavior, such as conscription.
1112 Y5 dependedonrather than G, this conclusion would require some
quantitative restrictions on 0, 4,, and the real rate of return elasticities
s d for Y and Y12Levis Kochin has suggested tke attractive altern.tive of using the
current overall tax rate as a roxy for the anticipatedlong-run average
ratio of government purchases: to GNP. A rationalefor identifying the tax
rate with the anticipated government expenditureratio is given in Barro
(l979a). The argument involves a deficit policythat smoothes tax rates
over time in order to minimize excess burden costsfor a given present value
of net tax collections. Some problems with implementingKochins suggestion
are 1) the distinction between purchasesand expenditures implies that a
separate model would be required to predictfuture transfers (including
interest payments), which is not obviously easier than modelingpurchases
directly; and 2) the use of the tax rate to proxythe permanent expenditure
ratio may work better for the federal governmentthan for total government.
See Benjamin and Kochin (1978), who argue that mobilitypossibilities would
prevent state and local governmentsfrom choosing an excess burden minimizing
debt policy. However, this issue involves alsothe federal government's inter-
action with state and local governments.
13The ratio of total casualties (including wounded but excluding deaths
that were unrelated to combat) to battle deaths is 5.3for the Spanish Añierican
War, 4.8 for World War I, 3.3 for World War II,4.0 for the Korean War, and 4.3
for the Vietnamese War. See the notes to table 1 for sourcesof casualty data.
14War probabilities and the distribution of sizes of wars need not be
constant over time, although there is no indicationof substantial structural
change in the small sample of evidence afforded bythe 200 years of U.S.
history. (The largest value for the B variablewould actually apply to the
(continued)Cu, 14 CQntinued)
Civil War; see the notes to table1.) From the standpoint ofconstructing
the g variable, shifts in the stochasticstructure for wars would essentially
be an alternative to thepresent specification that allows for shifts in spend-
ing for a given war structure, asrepresented by the stochastic variableu
in equation (11). In the context ofoutput analysis, it is unclear that there
would be much empirical difference betweenthese alternatives.
15 . - Theyear 1978 is not included in this calculation, although itcould
have been if peace during 1979were also included. War years are taken to be
1775-83, 1812—15, 1846—48, 1861—65, 1898,.1917—18, 1941—45, 1950—53, 1964—72.
There may be some objection tostarting the sample just before a war (which
is not independent of the start of U.S.data), but the results are not highly
sensitive to this chOice.
16Theprobability p2 refers to the existence of war during at leastpart
of a year following a period ofwar during at least part of the previousyear.
17This calculationpertains to the existence of peace over the entire






19Past history o theresiduals, lagged values of Dg or DgW, a
capital stock measure Dk, and a constant were all insignificant.20There are questionS about the exogenei-ty of the gvariables especially
because of the presence of Y inthe denominators. In preliminarYanalyses the
use of instruments forgW and gP, which involved the useof estimated rather
than actual values of Y inthedenominators, had a negligibleeffect on the
results.
21 '
DMis determined from the equationestimated over the 1941-78 sample:
L4 =.097+.481JM +.17DM +.O71FEDV+•o3l.log(u/l-U)1'
t (.023) 14)tl 12)t-2 (015) (.008)
t-
where observations from 1941-45 areweighted by .36. FEDVt
is real federal
spending relative to adistributed lag of itself and Uis the unemployment
rate in the total labor force.See Barro (1978, pp 550-51)for a discussion
of this equation.
22The deletion of the military personnel variable that was
included in
pervious analysis does resultin an increase in residual serialcorrelation
and also in the elimination of the significanceof the DMRt 2 variable.
231n the simple tiodel frou the theoretical section,this coefficient
would be an estimate of theparameter associatedwith defense purchases.
However, this interpretationwould be affected by a correlationbetween the
normal level of defense purchases andthe perceived long-run external military
threat to the United States. Changesin this long-run threat, which werenot
admitted in the model with stationary warprobabilities that wasconsidered
above, can be thought of as exertingnegative supply effects in equation(6).
p were regarded as a freelyestimated parameter, there would be
only 5 degrees of freedom, which would imply acritical value of 11,1.References
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